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Abstract	This	paper	advances	the	thesis	of	methodological	mechanism,	the	claim	that	to	be	committed	to	mechanism	is	to	adopt	a	certain	methodological	postulate,	i.e.	to	look	for	causal	pathways	for	the	phenomena	of	interest.	We	argue	that	methodological	mechanism	incorporates	a	minimal	account	of	understanding	mechanisms,	according	to	which	a	mechanism	just	is	a	causal	pathway	described	in	the	language	of	theory.	In	order	to	argue	for	this	position	we	discuss	a	central	example	of	a	biological	mechanism,	the	mechanism	of	cell	death,	known	as	apoptosis.	We	argue	that	this	example	shows	that	our	philosophically	de?lationary	account	is	suf?icient	in	order	to	have	an	illuminating	account	of	mechanisms	as	the	concept	is	used	in	biology.		
1.	Introduction	It	hardly	needs	emphasizing	that	talk	of	mechanisms	is	widespread	within	the	biomedical	sciences.	Pathologists	talk	about	“mechanisms	of	disease”	(Lakhani	et	al	2009)	and	pharmacologists	about	the	“mechanisms	of	action”	of	drugs	(Rang	et	al.	2016).	Molecular	biologists	talk	about	the	“fundamental	mechanisms	of	life”	(Alberts	et	al.	2014,	22),	such	as	DNA	replication	and	protein	synthesis;	developmental	biologists	talk	about	“genetic	mechanisms	of	animal	development”	(39),	“mechanisms	for	specifying	the	germ	layers”	(Wolpert	et	al.	2002,	89)	and	“mechanisms	of	axis	determination”	(143);	there	exist	“morphogenetic	mechanisms”	(254)	and	the	“mechanism	of	programmed	cell	death”	(Slack	2005,	214).	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	propose	a	minimal	way	of	understanding	mechanisms	and	to	argue	that	this	conception	is	suf?icient	in	order	to	have	an	illuminating	account	of	scienti?ic	practice.	We	will	focus	our	attention	on	a	central	example	of	a	biological	
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Forthcoming	in	Axiomathes	(Epistemologia	2017	Special	Issue:	Causality	and	Explanation	in	Scienti?ic	Practice).	The	?inal	publication	is	available	at	Springer	via	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9354-2
mechanism,	the	mechanism	of	cell	death,	known	as	apoptosis.	In	particular,	we	are	going	to	use	this	case	in	order	to	advance	the	philosophical	position	we	call	‘methodological	mechanism’:	the	claim	that	to	be	committed	to	mechanism	is	to	adopt	a	certain	methodological	postulate,	i.e.	to	look	for	causal	pathways	for	the	phenomena	of	interest.	Methodological	mechanism	and	the	de?lationary	account	of	mechanisms	that	it	incorporates	differs	from	recent	accounts	of	mechanisms	in	that	it	is	ontologically	non-committal;	moreover,	our	argument	will	unravel	some	limitations	inherent	in	any	attempt	to	extract	metaphysical	conclusions	from	scienti?ic	practice.		 We	begin	in	section	2	by	introducing	our	minimal	account	of	mechanisms	as	causal	pathways	and	then	in	section	3	we	outline	the	thesis	of	methodological	mechanism.	Next,	in	section	4,	after	a	description	of	the	early	research	on	cell	death,	we	examine	the	mechanisms	of	apoptosis	focusing	on	the	paper	by	Kerr	et	al.	(1972)	where	the	term	‘apoptosis’	was	?irst	introduced.	We	also	present	the	subsequent	history	of	research	on	apoptosis,	which	led	to	its	identi?ication	as	a	central	biological	mechanism.	In	section	5,	we	examine	the	distinction	between	apoptosis	and	other	mechanisms	of	cell	death.	In	section	6,	we	defend	our	truly	minimal	view	of	mechanisms	in	the	context	of	the	apoptosis-oncosis	distinction	and	draw	some	conclusions	concerning	the	nature	of	biological	mechanisms.	
2.	From	Metaphysics	to	Practice	What	kinds	of	commitments	does	talk	of	mechanisms	imply?	In	the	philosophy	of	science,	the	dominant	views	about	mechanisms	until	the	1980s	had	been	metaphysical.	As	we	have	noted	in	other	work	(Ioannidis	&	Psillos	2018),	mechanism	has	been	seen	as	a	view	about	causation:	mechanisms	were	taken	to	provide	the	missing	link	(Hume’s	“secret	connexion”)	between	the	cause	and	the	effect.	‘Mechanism’,	on	this	approach,	is	the	very	causal	connection,	and	has	been	described	in	various	ways	as	mark	transmission	(Salmon	1984),	persistence,	transference	or	possession	of	a	conserved	quantity	(Mackie	1974;	Salmon	1997;	Dowe	2000).		In	the	1990s,	the	new	mechanical	philosophy	emerged,	which	is	not	a	view	about	causation	per	se,	but	rather	a	view	about	the	causal	structure	of	the	world.		Since	then,	three	have	been	the	dominant	metaphysical	accounts	of	mechanism:	
Mechanisms	are	entities	and	activities	organized	such	that	they	are	productive	of	
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regular	changes	from	start	or	set-up	to	?inish	or	termination	conditions.	(Machamer,	Darden,	&	Craver	2000,	3)	
A	mechanism	for	a	behavior	is	a	complex	system	that	produces	that	behavior	by	the	interaction	of	a	number	of	parts,	where	the	interactions	between	parts	can	be	characterized	by	direct,	invariant,	change-relating	generalizations.	(Glennan	2002,	S344)			A	mechanism	is	a	structure	performing	a	function	in	virtue	of	its	component	parts,	component	operations,	and	their	organization.	The	orchestrated	functioning	of	the	mechanism	is	responsible	for	one	or	more	phenomena.	(Bechtel	&	Abrahamsen	2005,	423)	
We	have	examined	these	accounts	in	some	detail	elsewhere	(cf.	Psillos	2004;	Ioannidis	&	Psillos	2017).	What’s	important	to	stress	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper	is	that	despite	the	fact	that	all	these	accounts	are	quite	far	from	traditional	mechanistic	accounts	of	causation,	they	still	offer	what	we	might	call	a	‘metaphysically	in?lated	account	of	mechanism’.	In	spite	of	their	differences	in	detail,	they	are	all	committed	to	a	certain	metaphysics	of	mechanisms,	and	in	particular	to	a	certain	“new	mechanical	ontology”,	as	Glennan	has	put	it	in	an	unpublished	manuscript	(forthcoming).	This	“new	ontology”	of	entities,	activities,	interactions,	organisation	of	parts	into	wholes	and	the	like	creates	the	further	philosophical	need—which	mechanists	try	to	meet—to	explain	what	they	are	and	how	they	relate,	if	at	all,	with	more	traditional	metaphysical	categories.	The	key	claims	of	the	New	Mechanists	then,	we	think,	are	three:	1. The	world	consists	of	mechanisms.		2. A	mechanism	consists	of	objects	of	diverse	kinds	and	sizes	structured	in	such	a	way	that,	in	virtue	of	their	properties	and	capacities,	they	engage	in	a	variety	of	different	kinds	of	activities	and	interactions	such	that	a	certain	behaviour	B	or	a	certain	phenomenon	P	is	brought	about.			3. To	explain	a	certain	behaviour	B	or	a	certain	phenomenon	P	in	science	is	to	offer	the	mechanism	of	it.	So,	though	the	new	mechanists	do	not	commit	themselves	to	a	certain	global	metaphysics	of	mechanisms—they	do	not,	for	instance,	align	with	the	seventeenth	
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century	view	of	mechanism	as	con?igurations	of	matter	in	motion	subject	to	laws—their	project	is	not	much	less	metaphysical	when	they	try	to	offer	global	accounts	of	what	a	mechanism	is:	the	entities	might	be	diverse	but	they	are	organised	into	a	mechanism	in	virtue	of	their	powers,	capacities	or	activities	and/or	in	virtue	of	their	being	subjected	to	laws	or	at	least	to	invariant	generalisations.	Mechanisms	are	typically	taken	to	be	things	in	the	world,	with	objective	boundaries,	with	causally	interacting	parts	bringing	about	a	certain	phenomenon	P	or	manifesting	a	certain	behaviour	B.	Moreover,	the	blueprint	of	a	mechanistic	explanation	is	decomposition:	the	behaviour/function	of	a	system	is	explained	by	the	interactions/activities	of	its	parts.	In	an	attempt	to	offer	a	less	metaphysically	committed	view	of	mechanisms,	Illari	&	Williamson	(2012),	have	noted	that	“a	mechanism	for	a	phenomenon	consists	of	entities	and	activities	organized	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	responsible	for	the	phenomenon”	(2012,	120).	Glennan	has	recently	accepted	a	similar	view	and	has	characterised	it	Minimal	Mechanism:	A	mechanism	for	a	phenomenon	consists	of	entities	(or	parts)	whose	activities	and	interactions	are	organised	so	as	to	be	responsible	for	the	phenomenon.	Glennan	takes	it	that	an	advantage	of	this	minimal	account	is	that	mechanisms	are	everywhere	constituting	“the	causal	structure	of	the	world”	(forthcoming,	Ch.	2).	Though	we	think	both	Illari	&	Williamson	and	Glennan	move	the	issue	in	the	right	direction,	we	take	it	that,	as	it	stands,	their	‘minimal’	account	still	invites	a	number	of	metaphysical	questions	that	are	irrelevant	to	scienti?ic	practice.	For	instance,	they	invite	almost	all	of	the	questions	noted	above	as	to	the	status	of	entities,	their	difference	from	activities,	the	need	to	introduce	both	activities	and	interactions,	the	role	of	the	organisation	in	the	performance	of	the	function	etc.	These	might	be	philosophically	legitimate	questions	to	ask,	but	they	need	not	be	asked	and	answered	for	an	understanding	of	the	role	of	mechanisms	in	science.		So,	we	do	not	want	to	claim	that	the	general	philosophical	accounts	of	mechanisms	are	ill-motivated.	But	we	do	claim	that	they	in?late	the	concept	of	mechanism	as	this	is	used	in	science.	Take,	for	instance,	the	way	pathologists	talk	about	the	causes	and	mechanisms	of	diseases.	They	distinguish	between	causal	agents	(e.g.	viruses)	that	constitute	the	aetiology	of	a	disease,	and	pathogenesis,	which	concerns	the	mechanisms,	i.e.	the	causal	pathway	that	leads	from	the	causal	agent	to	a	disease	state	(Lakhani	et	al.	2009).	This	can	be	generalised	to	other	uses	of	‘mechanism’	within	life	
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sciences,	but	also	more	broadly:	when	scientists	talk	about	‘mechanisms’	they	do	so	in	the	context	of	searching	for	a	process,	i.e.	a	causal	pathway	the	identi?ication	of	which	would	explain	how	a	particular	phenomenon	is	brought	about.	If	the	causal	pathway	is	identi?ied,	there	is	little	further	interest	in	understanding	it	according	to	a	certain	theory	of	causation,	or	to	characterise	it	in	terms	of	entities	bearing	powers	or	engaging	in	activities,	or	being	involved	in	activities	and	interactions	and	the	like.	In	the	practice	of	science,	the	description	of	the	causal	pathway	in	the	language	of	theory	is	enough	for	the	identi?ication	of	the	mechanism.	
3.	Methodological	Mechanism	A	very	general,	then,	and	truly	minimal	way	to	understand	what	biologists	mean	by	a	‘mechanism’	in	most	(if	not	all)	contexts	is	this:	a	mechanism	is	(simply)	the	way	[causal	pathway]	a	result	is	brought	about.	‘Mechanism’	concerns	how	causes	(described	in	the	language	of	theories)	operate	to	bring	about	a	certain	effect.	To	identify	a	mechanism,	then,	is	to	identify	a	speci?ic	causal	pathway	that	connects	an	initial	‘cause’	(the	causal	agent)	with	a	speci?ic	result.	And	if	there	is	a	cause	for	a	speci?ic	effect,	there	exists	a	mechanism	that	accounts	for	how	the	cause	operates.	The	scienti?ic	task,	then,	is	to	identify	the	causal	pathway.	Identi?ication	of	the	causal	pathway	is	crucial	in	order	to	establish	that	a	causal	link	exists	between	a	putative	causal	agent	and	a	result	(e.g.	a	disease	state).	But	moreover,	knowing	the	causal	pathway	makes	interventions	possible	(and	in	the	case	of	pathology,	treatment).		Our	thesis	then	is	that	a	thin	but	methodologically	important	account	of	mechanism	is	the	following:	(TMM):	mechanism	=	causal	pathway	To	contrast	this	view	with	Glennan’s	Minimal	Mechanism	we	call	it:	Truly	Minimal	
Mechanism	(TMM).				 Part	of	the	inspiration	for	TMM	comes	from	what	J.	H.	Woodger	called	“methodological	mechanism”	(MM).	In	his	(1929)	Woodger	distinguished	between	two	ways	in	which	a	certain	notion	can	be	employed:	a	metaphysical	or	ontological	way	and	a	methodological	one.	The	latter	is	when	a	notion	is	used	for	the	purposes	of	description	“independently	of	its	metaphysical	interpretation”.	In	this	case,	Woodger	says,	the	notion	“is	employed	methodologically,	i.e.	simply	for	the	purpose	of	investigation”	(1929,	31).	The	advantage	of	this	use	is	that	the	notion	can	be	used	in	a	certain	practice	and	cast	
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light	on	it	independently	of	whatever	dif?iculties	(and	controversies)	are	raised	by	the	intricate	metaphysical	debates	concerning	what	its	worldly	reference	is	really	like.	According	to	Woodger,	taking	the	methodological	standpoint	amounts	to	asking	“the	methodological	mechanist	what	he	has	to	say	in	support	of	his	contention	that	the	mechanical	explanation	is	the	only	one	which	is	admissible	in	science”	(1929,	231).	Hence,	methodological	mechanism	is	a	view	about	mechanistic	explanation	and	its	admissibility,	and	not	about	the	blueprint	of	the	universe.	It’s	not	about	the	metaphysics	of	mechanism	but	about	the	use	of	the	concept	of	mechanism	in	science	and	in	particular	about	the	importance	of	identifying	causal	pathways.	In	adopting	this	view,	Woodger	noted	that	mechanism	is	a	“methodological	postulate”	which	as	such	“makes	no	assertions	about	the	nature	of	the	processes	studied,	but	merely	asserts	that	they	take	place	according	to	law,	or	‘work	in	an	orderly	way’”	(1929,	258).		 Taking	a	cue	from	Woodger’s	Methodological	Mechanism,	we	want	to	claim	that	commitment	to	mechanism	in	science	is	adopting	a	methodological	postulate	which	licenses	looking	for	the	causal	pathways	for	the	phenomena	of	interest.	Hence,	MM	licenses	adopting	TMM.	TMM	(mechanisms=causal	pathways)	allows	for	a	rich	understanding	of	the	use	of	this	concept	in	biology	(and	other	sciences)	without	getting	embroiled	in	a	debate	about	what	things	in	the	world	mechanisms	really	are	and	what	kind	of	metaphysical	categories	their	(theory-described)	components	fall	into.	Viewing	mechanism	as	a	methodological	thesis	allows	that	the	sought-after	identi?ication	of	the	causal	pathway	by	which	a	speci?ic	result	is	produced,	is	fully	captured	in	the	language	of	the	speci?ic	theory,	using	deeply	theory-laden	concepts.	It	forfeits	any	further	need,	for	the	purposes	of	understanding	how	mechanisms	explain,	to	offer	a	further	general	metaphysical	account	of	how	the	theory-described	entities	and	processes—the	causal	
pathway—fall	into	neat	metaphysical	categories. 	1It	bears	stressing	that	the	key	feature	of	MM	is	that	it	is	non-committal	about	fundamental	ontology.	It	adopts	the	postulate	that	scientists	should	always	try	to	identify	the	way	that	a	particular	phenomenon	is	produced,	but	it	says	nothing	about	how	causation	itself	is	to	be	understood	(in	terms	of	powers,	counterfactuals,	etc.),	or	about	what	the	fundamental	ontology	of	the	world	is	(whether	it	includes	powers,	activities,	regularities	etc.),	or	even	about	how	the	various	levels	of	mechanisms	relate	to	each	other	(reduction,	supervenience	etc.).	Hence,	MM	is	philosophically	neutral.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	MM	is	scienti?ically	neutral.	Insofar	as	it	is	adopted	it	licenses	
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mechanistic	(and	only	mechanistic)	explanations	of	the	phenomena	or	the	behaviours	to	be	explained.	Hence,	vitalistic	explanations	are	banned,	unless	‘vital	forces’	are	fed	into	the	causal	pathways	that	produce	an	effect	(a	requirement	no	so	easily	met,	by	the	way).	Admittedly,	TMM	is	thin.	But	it	does	not	follow	from	TMM	that	mechanisms	are	not	‘things	in	the	world’.	After	all,	they	are	causal	pathways!	The	point	is	that	there	is	no	need	to	say	something	‘deeper’	than	this	in	order	to	have	a	useful	concept	of	mechanism	that	elucidates	practice:	a	mechanism	(simply)	is	a	sequence	of	events	(or	a	process)	that	leads	from	an	initial	‘cause’	to	an	end-result.	While	in	pathology	and	elsewhere	there	is	a	distinction	between	a	‘causal	agent’	and	a	‘mechanism’,	strictly	speaking	when	we	have	a	mechanism	the	cause	should	be	taken	not	as	a	single	event	or	an	entity,	but	as	a	whole	sequence	of	them	which	lead	to	the	effect.	However,	we	could	keep	the	notion	of	a	‘causal	agent’	to	refer	to	an	event	or	an	entity	that	initiates	a	causal	pathway,	and	keep	the	term	‘mechanism’	for	the	causal	pathway	itself. 	2	 Though	MM	does	not	commit	us	to	a	speci?ic	view	about	how	causation	is	to	be	understood	from	a	metaphysical	point	of	view	(e.g.,	it	need	not	commit	itself	to	the	view	that	interaction	is	the	transmission	of	conserved	quantities,	etc.),	MM	can	still	clarify	the	close	relations	between	causation,	explanation	and	(the	identi?ication	of)	mechanisms:	at	least	when	there	is	no	genuine	indeterminism,	whatever	happens	has	a	prior	cause	and	identifying	the	way	the	cause	brings	about	the	effect	is	identifying	the	causal	pathway	by	means	of	which	the	cause	operates.		 A	possible	worry	here	might	be	that	MM	(and	TMM)	are	almost	vacuous,	since	everything	is	(or	has)	a	mechanism:	are	there	things-in-the-world	that	are	not	mechanisms?	The	worry	then	is	that	‘mechanism’	becomes	a	concept	devoid	of	real	empirical	content.	Note,	by	way	of	reply,	that	this	kind	of	worry	can	be	effective,	if	at	all,	against	‘thicker’	accounts	of	mechanism	too.	It	is	not	clear,	for	instance,	what	does	not	count	as	a	mechanism	on	Glennan’s	minimal	mechanism	account—though	on	Glennan’s	earlier	views	there	are	non-mechanisms	(only)	at	the	level	of	fundamental	physics.	Be	that	as	it	may,	our	answer	would	simply	be:	some	thing	is	not	a	mechanism	in	the	TMM	sense,	if	it	is	not	a	causal	pathway.	More	importantly,	however,	the	objection	has	a	bite	against	MM	only	if	MM	is	taken	to	be	a	metaphysical	thesis,	which	is	not.	As	such,	the	proper	contrast	is	not	what-in-the-world-is-not-a-mechanism	vs.	what-in-the-world-is-a-mechanism	but	rather:	are	there	alternative	methodological	standpoints?	That	is,	standpoints	which	explain	non-mechanistically?	In	the	17th	century,	for	example,	one	
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such	alternative	methodological	standpoint	was	identi?ied	by	Boyle	as	this	which	explained	by	reference	to	Aristotelian	substantial	forms.	In	the	context	of	the	early	twentieth	century	biology,	an	alternative	methodological	standpoint	would	be	vitalism.	Another	possible	objection	to	TMM	might	well	be	that	the	mechanism	cannot	be	identi?ied	with	the	causal	pathway	since	the	mechanism	is	an	arrangement	of	entities	capable	of	implementing	a	causal	pathway,	whether	or	not	the	causal	pathway	is	activated	(cf.	Illari	&	Williamson	2012).	In	reply,	we	should	note	that	the	causal	pathway,	as	we	understand	it,	and	as	will	be	made	vivid	with	the	case	of	apoptosis,	does	involve	entities,	since	it	is	entities	that	are	causally	connected	by	the	processes	of	the	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	the	required	effect.	So	the	mechanism	qua	the	causal	pathway	obviously	involves	entities.	But	to	call	an	arrangement	of	entities	mechanism,	in	our	view,	is	to	make	a	claim	about	the	causal	pathway,	which	according	to	the	theory	does	yield	a	certain	effect.	In	this	sense,	it	is	obvious	that	the	causal	pathway	need	not	be	activated,	given	the	entities;	but	for	the	mechanism	to	cause	anything	the	causal	pathway	should	be	initiated.		 A	?inal	natural	worry	would	be	the	following:	life	scientists	often	talk	about	organisms	or	parts	of	organisms	as	kinds	of	machines.	But	if	one	regards	organisms	as	machines,	isn’t	one	committed	to	some	strong	ontological	(e.g.	reductionist)	thesis	about	organisms?	Shouldn’t	then	MM	be	appropriately	modi?ied?	The	answer	is	that	the	machine	analogy	does	not	add	much	to	MM.	Let	us	take	again	a	look	at	the	pathology	textbook	mentioned	earlier	(Lakhani	et	al.	2009).	In	their	introduction,	the	authors	stress	that	they	“will	adopt	a	strongly	biomedical	concept	of	disease.	This	is	a	mechanistic	model	that	regards	the	body	as	a	machine	with	repairable	or	replaceable	parts.	It	looks	for	speci?ic	underlying	biological	causes	and	places	a	high	emphasis	on	the	scienti?ic	evidence-base	for	untangling	cause	and	effect	in	both	the	disease	and	its	treatment,	because	this	is	important	for	patient	care	and	prognosis”	(2009,	4).	But	although	they	adopt	a	mechanistic	model,	“it	is	a	complex	model	with	multiple	parts	that	interconnect.	A	change	in	one	area	is	likely	to	affect	another.	Thus	maintaining	homeostasis	is	not	a	simple	single	feedback	loop	and	it	is	perfectly	acceptable	that	a	new	equilibrium	is	achieved	under	a	new	set	of	circumstances,	a	new	baseline;	you	do	not	have	to	return	to	the	original	state”	(2009,	4).	On	this	account,	to	say	that	the	body	is	a	machine	(i.e.,	to	adopt	a	‘mechanistic	model’	concerning	the	body)	is	to	say	that	the	body	contains	various	interacting	parts	that	underlie	bodily	functions	and	sometimes	
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result	in	diseases,	such	that	it	is	possible	to	identify	cause	and	effect	relationships	and	to	intervene	to	treat	parts	that	malfunction.	In	other	words,	the	‘mechanistic	model’	can	be	seen	as	a	methodological	requirement	in	order	to	do	pathology.	Hence,	the	‘mechanistic	model’	mentioned	by	Lakhani	et	al.	is	an	instance	of	MM.		One	can	of	course	propose	stronger	requirements	for	when	a	system	is	properly	called	a	‘machine’,	or	a	process	‘mechanistic’.	For	example,	one	can	propose	a	causal	modularity	criterion,	according	to	which	for	a	process	to	count	as	‘mechanistic’,	there	should	exist	a	modular	representation	of	the	process	(see	Woodward	2002).	While	we	could	accept	such	more	robust	forms	of	MM,	we	think	that	the	thesis	of	MM	as	outlined	here,	with	its	incorporation	of	TMM	(i.e.	without	commitment	to	modularity),	is	suf?icient	for	capturing	the	many	uses	of	‘mechanism’	within	the	life	sciences.	
4.	Methodological	Mechanism	at	Work:	the	Case	of	Apoptosis		The	best	argument	in	favor	of	MM	and	TMM	is	that	this	is	the	conception	of	mechanism	one	?inds	in	scienti?ic	contexts	where	the	language	of	mechanisms	is	used.	In	order	to	substantiate	this	argument	from	scienti?ic	practice,	we	are	going	to	examine	a	central	example	of	a	type	of	biological	mechanism,	i.e.	the	mechanisms	of	cell	death.	This	example	is	particularly	instructive	for	drawing	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	mechanisms	in	life	sciences,	since	it	is	a	case	in	which	a	new	mechanism—what	came	to	be	known	as	apoptosis—was	identi?ied.		 The	history	of	cell	death	can	be	traced	back	to	the	mid-19th	century,	when	biologists	were	already	aware	that	there	exist	processes	that	lead	to	the	death	of	cells	(cf.	Clarke	&	Clarke	1996).	Cytologists	of	the	time,	such	as	Walther	Flemming	in	1885,	had	even	observed	cells	undergoing	what	we	now	consider	as	apoptosis.	However,	in	the	following	decades	and	during	the	1960s	and	even	later,	there	was	not	much	interest	from	biologists	in	cell	death.	To	explain	why	this	was	so,	Richard	A.	Lockshin	notes	that	biologists	at	that	time	“tended	to	think	that	death	was	accidental	and	that	mitosis	was	the	active	homeostatic	process”—cell	death	was	not	yet	viewed	as	a	“biological	process”	(Lockshin	2008,	1092).		In	the	1960s,	new	technological	developments	(e.g.	electron	microscopy,	improved	histological	techniques)	started	a	new	era	in	the	study	of	cell	death.	In	1964,	Lockshin	and	Carroll	Williams	published	a	paper	with	the	title	“Programmed	Cell	Death”	(Lockshin	&	Williams	1964).	According	to	Lockshin	&	Zakeri,	this	new	expression	
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(“programmed	cell	death”)	was	meant	to	capture	the	fact	that	“cells	followed	a	sequence	of	controlled	(and	thereby	implicitly	genetic)	steps	towards	their	own	destruction”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	546).		That	such	a	controlled	process	existed	was	well	known	to	developmental	biologists.	John	W.	Saunders	had	already	noticed	that	there	exist	“reproducible	patterns	of	cell	death	in	chick	embryos”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	546)	and	the	same	was	the	case	concerning	metamorphic	cell	deaths	in	insects.	As	he	put	it,	“abundant	death,	often	cataclysmic	in	its	onslaught,	is	a	part	of	early	development	in	many	animals;	it	is	the	usual	method	of	eliminating	organs	and	tissues	that	are	useful	only	during	embryonic	or	larval	life	or	that	are	but	phylogenetic	vestiges”	(Saunders	1966,	154).	Characteristically,	Saunders	wrote	about	a	“death	clock”	intrinsic	in	cells:	cells	that	normally	die	during	chick	development,	would	also	die	“on	schedule”	in	culture.	If,	however,	they	were	transplanted	to	a	different	area	of	other	chicks,	they	survived.	It	was	evident	from	this	that	cell	death	is	a	controlled	and	regulated	process.		 To	be	sure,	the	idea	of	“programmed	cell	death”	was	metaphorical.	As	Lockshin	explains	in	a	recent	review	on	the	history	of	the	subject,	it	was	“a	felicitous	turn	of	phrase	designed	to	exploit	the	trendiness	of	the	then-nascent	computer	era.	The	intent	was	to	focus	attention	on	what	was	relatively	obvious:	that	cell	deaths	in	developing	and	metamorphosing	animals	occurred	at	predictable	developmental	stages	and	in	speci?ic	locations.	They	must	be	‘programmed’	into	the	genetics	of	the	organisms,	in	the	same	sense	that	the	differentiation	and	growth	of	an	organ,	tissue,	structure,	or	pigment	would	be	considered	to	be	fundamentally	determined	by	the	interplay	of	speci?ic	genes”	(Lockshin	2016,	10-11).		 John	F.	R.	Kerr,	who	had	been	working	on	the	processes	of	cell	death	since	the	1960s,	notes	that	at	the	time	most	researchers	were	“equating	cell	death	with	cell	degeneration”	(Kerr	2002,	472).	So,	an	early	hypothesis	was	that	cell	death	was	the	result	of	damaged	lysosomes,	which	were	viewed	as	“suicide	bags”.	Kerr,	however,	had	discovered	a	certain	type	of	cell	death	that	was	“non-degenerative	in	nature”	(472)—he	?irst	named	it	“shrinkage	necrosis”	(Kerr	1971).	This	was	no	accident;	the	initial	thought	was	that	this	process	was	a	type	of	necrosis.	But	soon	Kerr	noted	that	it	was	a	different	kind	of	mechanism—what	he	and	his	collaborators	called	“apoptosis”.		Shrinkage	necrosis	was	identi?ied	by	studying	ischaemic	liver	injury.	It	was	a	type	of	cell	death	that	differed	from	classical	necrosis	both	morphologically,	in	that	it	
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involved	scattered	cells	that	were	converted	in	small	round	bodies,	rather	than	group	of	cells	as	in	classical	necrosis,	and	also	chemically,	in	that	during	shrinkage	necrosis	lysosomes	were	preserved,	again	in	contrast	to	classical	necrosis	were	they	ruptured.	In	his	1971	paper,	Kerr	concluded:	“[s]hrinkage	necrosis	is	a	distinct	and	important	type	of	cell	death,	which	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	the	past.	It	probably	results	from	noxious	stimuli	that	are	insuf?iciently	severe	to	produce	coagulative	necrosis”	(19).		 The	concept	of	apoptosis	was	introduced	in	a	seminal	paper	in	1972	by	Kerr,	Andrew	H.	Wyllie	and	Alastair	R.	Currie	to	refer	to	what	the	authors	explicitly	described	as	“a	hitherto	little	recognized	mechanism	of	controlled	cell	deletion”	(1972,	239).	What	did	Kerr	et	al.	do	to	identify	the	mechanism	of	apoptosis?	They	described	it	in	the	language	of	theory	as	a	“vital	biological	phenomenon”,	which	is	“complementary	to	mitosis	in	the	regulation	of	animal	cell	populations”	(241).	This	was	mainly	a	description	of	the	speci?ic	causal	pathway	of	the	deletion	of	“scattered	single	cells”	(241).		 	There	are	two	main	stages	in	the	apoptotic	process	as	shown	by	electron	microscopy:	?irst,	so-called	apoptotic	bodies	are	formed;	second,	apoptotic	bodies	are	phagocytosed	and	degraded	by	other	cells.	Apoptotic	bodies	are	small	spherical	membrane-bound	structures	that	contain	condensed,	but	otherwise	intact	and	functional,	cell	organelles	and	fragments	of	nuclei.	During	the	formation	of	apoptotic	bodies	the	nucleus	and	the	cytoplasm	condense,	the	nucleus	fragments	and	protuberances	are	formed	on	the	surface	of	the	cell.	The	cell	then	breaks	apart	and	from	the	protuberances	the	apoptotic	bodies	are	formed.	Within	the	cells	that	phagocytose	them,	apoptotic	bodies	show	changes	that	are	“very	similar	to	ischaemic	coagulative	necrosis”.	But,	in	contrast	to	coagulative	necrosis,	the	absence	of	in?lammation	in	apoptosis	results	in	a	process	of	cell	death	with	minimal	disruption	of	the	tissue.	So,	apoptosis	is	distinct	from	necrosis	and,	as	Kerr	et	al.	put	it,	“is	well	suited	to	a	role	in	tissue	homoeostasis,	since	it	can	result	in	extensive	deletion	of	cells	with	little	tissue	disruption”	(250).		 Crucially,	the	morphological	changes	that	occur	during	apoptosis	were	“essentially	the	same”	(244)	in	various	types	of	circumstances	studied	by	the	authors,	both	physiological	and	pathological.	Establishing	this	point	was	important,	as	a	mistake	that	had	previously	been	made	in	various	cases	was	to	confuse	apoptotic	bodies	that	have	been	phagocytosed	with,	for	example,	autophagic	vacuoles	(which	often	appear	
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similar	under	the	electron	microscope).	For	example,	apoptosis	was	found	by	Kerr	and	his	collaborators	to	occur	spontaneously	in	both	treated	and	untreated	malignant	tumors,	was	involved	in	cases	of	pathological	atrophy	but	also	of	normal	involution	of	tissues,	in	normal	development	(e.g.	during	the	development	of	digits)	and	in	general	in	cellular	turnover	in	normal	adults.	It	was	then	taken	to	be	a	ubiquitous	mechanism:	“a	distinctive	morphological	process	(…)	which	plays	a	complementary	but	opposite	role	to	mitosis	in	the	regulation	of	animal	cell	populations”	(255-6).			 Incidentally,	the	description	of	the	mechanism	of	controlled	cell	deletion	makes	clear	that	the	full	knowledge	of	the	causal	pathway	is	not	necessary	for	the	identi?ication	of	the	mechanism.	Kerr	et	al.	noted	that	“the	mechanism”	of	the	all-important	condensation	of	both	nucleus	and	cytoplasm	in	the	?irst	stage	of	apoptosis	was	unknown.	As	they	put	it,	“the	condensation	is	presumably	a	consequence	of	the	extrusion	of	water,	but	its	mechanism	is	still	unknown”	(244).	Moreover,	in	1972	little	was	known	“of	the	factors	that	initiate	apoptosis	or	of	the	nature	of	the	cellular	mechanisms	activated	before	the	appearance	of	the	characteristic	morphological	changes”	(255).	Still	enough	of	its	causal	pathway	was	known	to	conclude	that	“[t]he	ultrastructural	features	of	apoptosis	and	its	initiation	and	inhibition	by	a	variety	of	environmental	stimuli	suggest	to	us	that	it	is	an	active,	controlled	process”	(256).	By	describing	the	morphological	pattern	(causal	pathway)	of	the	apoptotic	process	and	the	various	circumstances	where	it	occurs,	the	authors	reach	the	crucial	conclusion	that	apoptosis	has	a	regulatory	role	within	the	organism:	it	“subserves	a	general	homeostatic	function”	(Kerr	2002,	471).	This	regulatory	role	is	the	most	important	difference	with	coagulative	necrosis,	the	classical	type	of	cell	death	that	had	already	been	described	morphologically	in	detail	and	which	Kerr	et	al.	contrasted	to	apoptosis.	Coagulative	necrosis	does	not	regulate	cell	populations,	as	it	is	brought	about	when	homeostatic	mechanisms	are	irreversibly	disturbed	and	is	always	caused	by	“noxious	stimuli”	(Kerr	et	al.	1972,	239);	whereas,	apoptosis	is	caused	by	both	pathological	and	physiological	stimuli.	The	triggering	of	apoptosis	by	physiological	stimuli	is	the	reason	why	apoptosis	is	considered	of	great	importance	by	the	authors.		 Summing	up	the	events	that	led	to	the	1972	paper,	Kerr	writes	in	a	later	review	that	“[a]	serendipitous	con?luence	of	ideas	thus	made	the	formulation	of	the	apoptosis	concept	virtually	inevitable”	(Kerr	2002,	473).	These	ideas	involved	the	realisation	that	apoptosis	is	a)	a	distinctive	morphological	process,	b)	ubiquitous	and	non-disruptive,	
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and	c)	triggered	by	physiological	stimuli.	Since	then	a	form	of	‘physiological	cell	death’	balancing	cell	populations	must	exist,	and	necrosis	cannot	play	this	role	while	apoptosis	is	well	suited	to	it,	apoptosis	was	proposed	as	the	mechanism	with	exactly	this	regulatory	role	across	animals.	By	the	middle	1970s	it	was	broadly	recognised	that	“cell	death	was	as	much	a	part	of	cell	biology	as	mitosis,	extension	of	an	axon,	the	enzymatic	sequence	of	glycolysis,	or	secretion”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	547).	Actually,	since	its	?irst	formulation	in	1972,	apoptosis	has	become	a	fundamental	research	area	in	biology.	The	main	reason	for	this	steady	increase	in	importance,	especially	during	the	last	two	decades,	was	the	realisation	of	its	central	role	in	many	functions	within	the	organism.	By	the	middle	of	1990s,	cell	death	“was	recognized	as	an	interesting	and	biological	event”;	it	was	seen	not	just	as	“an	incidental	part	of	life”,	but	as	“a	highly	controlled	and	medically	important	element	of	existence”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	545).		 In	fact,	there	are	three	main	reasons	that	can	explain	why	the	?ield	of	apoptosis	was	transformed	from	a	modest	topic	to	a	central	?ield	of	biological	research.	First,	it	was	discovered	that	apoptosis	was	much	more	common	than	was	initially	thought	by	the	development	of	techniques	that	made	it	easier	to	identify	instances	of	apoptosis.	Second,	conserved	genes	that	control	cell	death	were	identi?ied,	starting	with	the	genes	that	determine	the	developmental	pathway	for	programmed	cell	death	in	Caenorhabditis	
elegans	(cf.	Ellis	&	Horvitz	1986).	Unravelling	the	molecular	genetic	mechanisms	regulating	cell	death	by	using	Caenorhabditis	elegans	as	a	model	that	began	in	late	1970s	was	a	breakthrough	in	the	study	of	regulated	cell	death.	It	was	thus	established	that	cell	death	was	genetically	based,	and	various	important	genes	that	are	involved	in	the	regulation	of	apoptosis	were	identi?ied	(e.g.	bcl-2,	fas,	p53,	ced-3,	cf.	Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001).		 The	third	reason	which	explains	why	the	?ield	of	cell	death	increased	in	importance	around	1990,	were	discoveries	that	showed	the	clinical	relevance	of	cell	death	and	the	relation	between	it	and	?ields	such	as	immunology	and	cancer	research.	For	example,	the	gene	bcl-2,	a	B-cell	lymphoma	gene,	was	identi?ied	as	an	anti-apoptotic	gene.	This	established	a	relation	between	apoptosis	and	“differentiation	and	maintenance	of	the	immune	system”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	549).	In	the	1990s	too,	ced-3	in	Caenorhabditis	elegans	was	sequenced	and	it	was	discovered	that	it	was	related	to	a	mammalian	protease,	and	that	a	family	of	such	proteases	exist.	Known	as	caspases,	
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these	proteases	are	central	components	of	the	apoptosis	pathway	and	their	sequence	is	widely	conserved	among	animals.		The	causal	pathway	of	apoptosis	can	then	nowadays	be	characterised	not	only	morphologically,	but	also	biochemically.	We	will	now	brie?ly	describe	the	main	events	of	the	mammalian	apoptosis	pathway	(for	a	more	detailed	description	see,	for	example,	Shiozaki	&	Shi	2004).	Apoptosis	can	mainly	occur	via	two	distinct	signalling	pathways:	the	intrinsic	pathway,	where	the	apoptotic	signal	comes	from	inside	the	cell,	and	the	extrinsic	pathway,	where	the	apoptotic	signal	comes	from	outside.	Common	to	both	pathways	is	what	is	known	as	the	caspase	cascade.	Caspases	are	enzymes	that	perform	proteolysis	and	are	central	components	in	both	pathways.	They	exist	in	the	cytoplasm	under	normal	conditions,	but	not	in	an	active	form.	For	apoptosis	to	occur,	some	caspases	need	to	be	activated.	In	turn,	these	active	caspases	activate	other	caspases;	this	is	the	caspase	cascade,	which	eventually	leads	to	the	morphological	changes	of	apoptosis	mentioned	earlier.	The	extrinsic	signalling	pathway	starts	with	the	binding	of	an	extracellular	death	ligand	to	a	death	receptor.	For	example,	T-lymphocytes	have	a	Fas	ligand	which	can	bind	to	the	Fas	receptor,	a	protein	located	on	the	surface	of	the	cell.	The	binding	of	the	Fas	ligand	to	the	Fas	receptor	is	the	signal	for	the	cell	to	commit	suicide.	The	Fas	receptor	has	a	domain	within	the	cell	(FADD	-Fas	Associated	Death	Domain);	when	the	ligand	binds	to	the	Fas	receptor,	FADD	is	activated	and	recruits	the	FADD	adaptor	protein.	Subsequently,	procaspase-8	or	10	binds	to	the	adaptor	protein.	The	formation	of	this	complex	(known	as	DISC	-Death	Inducing	Signalling	Complex)	is	the	signal	for	the	caspase	cascade	to	occur.	The	procaspases	are	cleaved	and	active	caspases	8	or	10	are	formed.	These	initiator	caspases	activate	the	effector	caspase-3	that	breaks	down	intracellular	proteins.	Central	component	in	the	regulation	of	the	intrinsic	signalling	pathway	is	the	bcl-2	family	of	proteins.	This	pathway	is	initiated,	for	example,	when	there	is	DNA	damage	that	cannot	be	repaired.	A	central	event	in	this	pathway	is	the	release	of	cytochrome	c,	a	protein	that	normally	exists	in	the	intermembrane	space	of	mitochondria,	into	the	cytosol.	The	release	of	cytochrome	c	initiates	the	caspase	cascade.	This	release	occurs	when	pro-apoptotic	bcl-2	proteins	(Bax,	Bak)	aggregate	to	form	a	channel	in	the	outer	mitochondrial	membrane.	In	normal	circumstances	there	is	
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a	balance	between	anti-apoptotic	and	pro-apoptotic	proteins:	anti-apoptotic	proteins	(like	Bcl-2	and	Bcl-xL)	bind	to	the	pro-apoptotic	ones,	thereby	stopping	them	from	forming	the	channels.	But	when	DNA	is	damaged,	other	pro-apoptotic	bcl-2	proteins	(BH3-only	proteins)	are	synthesised,	which	bind	to	the	anti-apoptotic	ones,	thereby	inhibiting	the	inhibitors.	When	cytochrome	c	is	released	into	the	cytosol,	it	binds	to	Apaf-1	(Apoptotic	protease	activation	factor	1).	This	in	turn	causes	Apaf-1	proteins	to	oligomerise	and	form	the	apoptosome,	which	activates	caspase-9	(the	initiator	caspase),	which	in	turn	activates	the	effector	caspase-3	that	breaks	down	intracellular	proteins.	
5.	Mechanisms	of	Cell	Death	An	important	issue	that	crops	up	here	for	MM	is	how	the	various	causal	pathways	are	identi?ied	and	distinguished	from	each	other.	Could	it	be	the	case	that	some	causal	pathways	are	mechanisms	in	a	more	robust	sense	while	others	are	merely	causal	pathways?	In	the	case	at	hand,	the	issue	is	how	apoptosis	can	be	distinguished	from	other	cell-death	processes.	As	we	have	noted	already,	the	activation	of	caspases	underlies	the	morphological	changes	that	occur	during	apoptosis.	However,	not	all	processes	of	cell	death	are	apoptotic	(i.e.	not	all	processes	that	lead	to	cell	death	feature	the	particular	sequence	of	morphological	changes	associated	with	apoptosis),	neither	do	all	involve	caspase	activation.	This	is	why	in	the	literature	on	cell	death	there	are	more	general	terms	that	are	used	to	refer	to	the	various	types	of	processes	of	cell	death:	on	the	one	hand,	there	is	‘physiological’	or	‘regulated’	cell	death;	on	the	other,	‘accidental	cell	death’.	Lockshin	&	Zakeri	explain	the	difference	between	the	two	by	noting	that	when	cells	die	as	a	result	of	a	process	of	physiological	cell	death,	“such	deaths	are	part	of	the	normal	function	of	the	organism”;	also,	in	physiological	cell	death	genetic	regulation	is	central.	This	is	not	the	case	in	“necrosis	or	oncosis	which	is	accidental	and	in	which	the	cell	has	no	active	role”	(Lockshin	&	Zakeri	2001,	545).		 Could	it	then	be	the	case	that	there	is	a	genuine	difference	between	apoptosis	and	necrosis	such	that	apoptosis	is	a	mechanism	in	a	more	robust	sense	than	just	the	causal	pathway	for	cell	deletion,	whereas	necrosis	is	merely	a	causal	pathway?	To	address	this	issue,	let	us	note	?irst	that	as	Majno	&	Joris	(1995)	have	pointed	out,	apoptosis	and	necrosis	should	not	be	juxtaposed:	apoptosis	is	a	process	that	leads	to	cell	death,	but	necrosis	should	not	be	used	to	refer	to	such	a	process.	As	they	stress,	there	is	a	distinction	between	cell	death	and	necrosis:	cell	death	comes	about	before	necrotic	
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changes	can	be	observed.	Necrotic	changes	(for	example,	karyolysis,	karyorhexis,	loss	of	structure	in	the	cytoplasm)	“are	the	features	of	a	cell’s	cadaver,	whatever	the	mechanism	of	the	cell’s	death,	be	it	ischaemia,	heat,	toxins,	mechanical	trauma,	or	even	apoptosis”	(Majno	&	Joris	1995,	11).	This	has	actually	been	the	traditional	meaning	of	necrosis,	i.e.	it	refers	to	changes	in	tissues	that	are	visible	even	without	a	microscope	and	as	such	occur	after	cell	death. 	3	 This	point	has	been	emphasised	also	by	other	authors.	So,	according	to	Kanduc	et	al.	(2002,	167),	it	is	“scienti?ically	unjusti?ied”	and	“unsound”	to	compare	apoptosis	to	necrosis,	as	apoptosis	is	a	process	that	leads	to	cell	death,	whereas	necrosis	refers	to	changes	that	occur	to	cells	after	they	die.	In	general	then,	we	should	distinguish	between	the	processes	that	a	dying	cell	undergoes	(e.g.	apoptosis)	and	the	end	result	of	these	processes,	which	is	the	dead	cell.	‘Necrosis’	should	then	refer	to	already	dead	cells	and	tissues	and	the	changes	that	occur	after	cell	death	(see	also	Fink	&	Cookson	2005).	This	usage	of	the	term	‘necrosis’	is	precisely	the	one	suggested	by	the	Committee	on	the	Nomenclature	of	Cell	Death	chartered	by	the	Society	of	Toxicologic	Pathologists	to	make	recommendations	“about	the	use	of	the	terms	‘apoptosis’	and	‘necrosis’	in	toxicity	studies”	(Levin	et	al.	1999,	484).	In	line	with	the	above,	this	Committee	recommended	that	“when	dead	cells	or	tissues	are	observed	in	a	histological	lesion,	‘necrosis’	is	the	appropriate	morphological	diagnosis,	regardless	of	the	pathway	by	which	the	cells	or	tissues	died”	(Levin	et	al.	1999).	They	conclude:	“[t]his	Committee	believes	that	returning	to	the	long-established	histopathological	standard	wherein	the	word	necrosis	denotes	dead	cells	in	a	living	tissue	(regardless	of	their	phenotype)	should	help	to	alleviate	the	confusion	attendant	on	the	notion,	held	by	many,	that	a	dichotomy	exists	between	apoptosis	and	necrosis”	(Levin	et	al.	1999).	Notably,	Sloviter	(2002,	22)	goes	as	far	as	to	note	that	“the	term	necrosis	is	now	virtually	meaningless	because	‘necrotic’	means	nothing	more	than	‘dead’”.			 According	to	Majno	and	Joris,	“the	major	sore	spot	in	the	nomenclature	of	cell	death	is	precisely	the	lack	of	a	suitable	name	for	cell	death	that	occurs	not	by	apoptosis	but	by	some	external	agent”	(Majno	&	Joris	1995,	11).	And	this	is	precisely	the	point:	cell	death	might	have	different	causal	pathways	and	the	difference	between	them	is	not	that	one	(or	some)	of	them	counts	as	a	mechanism	while	the	other	does	not;	rather	the	difference	is	in	how	they	are	described.			 Majno	and	Joris’s	own	suggestion	is	to	characterise	apoptosis	in	contrast	with	a	
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speci?ic	process	of	cell	death	they	call	“oncosis”	(1995,	12).	A	common	non-apoptotic	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	cell	death	is	when	groups	of	cells	die	of	ischaemia	(ischaemic	necrosis).	During	the	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	ischaemic	necrosis	the	cell	swells	and	it	is	in	order	to	capture	this	swelling	process	that	the	authors	propose	‘oncosis’	as	a	term	to	refer	to	this	mechanism.	This	causal	pathway	can	nowadays	be	characterised	in	detail:	reduced	supply	of	oxygen	and	nutrients	leads	to	ATP	depletion,	which	ultimately	results	in	protein	denaturation,	enzymatic	digestion	due	to	damaged	lysosomes	and	loss	of	integrity	of	the	plasma	membrane,	resulting	in	in?lux	of	water	and	calcium	into	the	cell,	leading	to	swelling	and	ultimately	rupture	of	the	cell.	Also,	we	know	that	ischaemia	typically	activates	the	causal	pathway,	but	toxic	agents	can	also	initiate	it.	We	can	then	talk	about	the	mechanism	of	oncosis	in	our	minimal	methodological	sense	of	the	term.	Oncosis	and	apoptosis,	then,	are	two	causal	pathways	(and	hence	mechanisms)	of	cell	death	–by	swelling	and	by	shrinkage,	respectively.		However,	there	might	be	a	way	to	distinguish	apoptosis	from	oncosis	such	that	only	the	former	counts	as	a	mechanism.	We	will	consider	three	distinctions	used	by	researchers	of	cell	death	that	might	be	used	in	order	to	do	this:	i)	processes	of	physiological	vs.	accidental	cell	death,	ii)	processes	of	programmed	vs.	non-programmed	cell	death	and	iii)	active	vs.	passive	processes.	A	term	widely	used	to	describe	a	non-apoptotic,	non-physiological	type	of	cell	death	is	‘accidental	cell	death’.	By	describing	a	process	of	cell	death	as	‘accidental’,	biologists	try	to	capture	the	idea	that,	in	contrast	to	apoptosis,	this	is	not	a	process	that	occurs	under	normal	conditions,	nor	does	it	serve	a	general	homeostatic	function	within	the	organism.	However,	as	Majno	and	Joris	(1995)	note,	apoptosis	can	also	be	induced	by	a	variety	of	‘accidental’	causes	(e.g.	heat,	chemical	agents,	viruses).	Levin	et	al.	also	note	that	“dead	cells	having	the	cytological	features	of	apoptosis	can	occur	in	large	numbers	as	a	pathological	change,	e.g.,	‘single	cell	necrosis’	in	the	liver	and	lymphocyte	necrosis	in	the	thymus,	and	that	these	changes	can	be	induced	by	exogenous	events	such	as	exposure	to	toxicants”	(Levin	et	al.	1999,	485).	So,	the	very	fact	that	apoptosis	can	be	initiated	by	‘accidental	causes’	shows	that	the	right	contrast	here	is	not	between	mechanism	and	non-mechanism,	but	rather	between	physiological	cell	death	and	accidental	cell	death,	where	‘physiological	cell	death’	refers	to	a	process	of	cell	death	that	was	initiated	by	physiological	stimuli.	
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	 What	about	the	programmed	–	non-programmed	distinction?	An	important	point	here	is	that	‘programmed	cell	death’	and	apoptosis	should	not	be	identi?ied;	thus,	the	former	cannot	be	used	to	distinguish	the	latter.	Programmed	cell	death	is	the	phenomenon	where	cells	die	‘on	schedule’,	i.e.	they	are	programmed	to	die	at	a	speci?ic	time.	During	development	of	the	chick,	for	example,	the	morphology	of	the	wing	is	produced	as	a	result	of	the	death	of	groups	of	cells;	there	is	a	‘genetic	clock’	that	determines	when	the	cells	will	die.	But	when	the	time	comes	for	the	cell	to	die,	the	speci?ic	programme	that	determines	the	form	that	cell	suicide	will	take,	is	triggered.	The	particular	form	of	cell	suicide	can	be	apoptosis	(indeed,	very	frequently	it	is),	but	it	need	not	be.	As	Majno	and	Joris	stress:	“The	genetic	programme	of	programmed	cell	death	is	a	clock	specifying	the	time	for	suicide,	whereas	the	genetic	programme	of	apoptosis	speci?ies	the	weapons	(the	means)	to	produce	instant	suicide”	(1995,	11):	the	weapon	is	precisely	what	we	call	the	causal	pathway.	Again,	the	point	here	is	that	one	cannot	use	this	distinction	to	distinguish	apoptosis	as	a	genuine	mechanism.	Biologists,	we	noted	above,	have	characterised	the	contrast	between	processes	of	cell	death	along	the	active-passive	lines:	apoptosis	was	described	as	‘active’	from	the	very	beginning	of	its	introduction,	and	contrasted	with	the	‘passive’	necrosis .	Perhaps	4what	makes	apoptosis	a	mechanism,	then,	is	precisely	that	it	is	an	active	process.	However,	what	does	this	distinction	really	mean?	The	idea	here	seems	to	be	that	in	the	case	of	apoptosis	the	cell	is	itself	involved	in	its	own	demise	(‘cell	suicide’),	whereas	in	the	case	of	oncosis	the	cell	dies	as	a	result	of	some	exogenous	in?luence	(‘cell	murder’).	That	is,	apoptosis	involves	a	‘suicide	programme’	that	is	initiated	under	various	circumstances	and	that	is	genetically	based,	in	the	sense	that	there	exist	speci?ic	genes	that	code	for	various	components	of	the	biochemical	pathway	underlying	the	apoptotic	process	(the	distinctions	regulated	vs.	non-regulated,	ordered	vs.	unordered,	controlled	vs.	non-controlled	appear	to	be	used	in	a	similar	way).		To	make	this	clear,	Sloviter	(2002,	23),	after	describing	the	two	causal	pathways	as	‘active	cell	death’	(ACD)	and	‘passive	cell	death’,	notes	that	ACD	is	active	in	the	sense	that	it	requires	“active	intracellular	processes	for	death	to	result”,	whereas	in	passive	cell	death	“the	cell	plays	no	role	in	its	own	demise”,	that	is,	cell	death	is	“immediate	and	involves	no	cellular	activity”,	the	cause	being	exogenous	to	the	cell	such	as	“rapid	freezing,	aldehyde	?ixation,	heat	denaturation,	and	catastrophic	physical	destruction”.	As	such,	passive	cell	death	is	of	little	interest	since	being	immediate	it	“offers	no	
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therapeutic	window”.	The	important	point	for	us	is	that	this	difference	between	‘active’	and	‘passive’	is	merely	a	difference	concerning	the	details	of	each	causal	pathway.	Hence,	there	is	no	intrinsic	difference	between	the	two	causal	pathways	as	such:	there	is	nothing	particularly	active	in	apoptosis	and	particularly	passive	in	oncosis.	The	signi?icant	difference	from	a	biological	point	of	view	is	that	because	apoptosis	involves	a	‘suicide	programme’,	it	can	serve	a	homeostatic	function,	as	argued	by	Kerr	et	al.	(1972).			 To	avoid	the	insinuation	that	the	use	of	‘active’	and	‘passive’	processes	might	lead	to	views	about	the	ontology	of	causation	and	mechanisms	(e.g.	to	the	distinction	between	entities	and	activities,	as	in	MDC	(2000)),	let	us	see	how	biologists	view	the	active-passive	distinction.	Kanduc	et	al.	say:	“[i]t	is	frequently	assumed	that	the	death	of	cells	can	be	passive.	This	non-biological	point	of	view	on	cell	death	ignores	the	role	of	cell	death	in	cell	development	and	adaptation.	It	cannot	be	assumed	that	‘ordinary’	cell	death	or	‘necrosis’	is	a	passive	process	while	the	presumed	special	form	of	cell	death,	‘apoptosis’	is	active.	Both	the	ante-mortem	and	postmortem	changes	are	active	since	both	
are	enzyme-catalysed	biochemical	reactions”	(Kanduc	et	al.	2002,	167-168,	emphasis	added).	
6.	Is	Mechanism	more	than	the	Causal	Pathway?	Hence,	apoptosis	and	oncosis	can	both	be	considered	mechanisms	in	the	truly	minimal	sense:	they	are	both	causal	pathways	that	produce	a	result	(apoptotic	and	ischaemic	necrosis,	respectively).	However,	the	history	of	programmed	cell	death	and	apoptosis	during	the	last	60	years	might	be	used	to	argue	that	in	biological	practice	what	counts	as	a	biological	mechanism	cannot	just	be	a	matter	of	identifying	a	speci?ic	causal	pathway.	Apoptosis	seems	to	be	a	special	kind	of	causal	process	with	distinctive	features	that	deserves	to	be	labeled	a	mechanism.	This	can	even	been	seen	in	biologists’	description	of	apoptosis	as	a	‘mechanism	of	cell	death’.		 Note	that	the	reason	apoptosis	became	a	central	biological	mechanism	is	not	due	to	some	feature	internal	to	the	sequence	of	events	that	constitutes	the	apoptotic	pathway,	but	rather	due	to	features	that	are	external	to	the	pathway	itself,	i.e.	because	it	is	a	key	process	that	controls	homeostasis.	It	is	its	role	within	the	developing	and	adult	organism	that	led	to	the	formulation	of	the	concept	by	Kerr	et	al.	in	their	(1972);	similarly,	it	is	the	discovery	of	its	highly	controlled	nature	and	conservation	of	the	
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genetic	sequences	of	the	components	of	the	apoptotic	pathway	across	animals,	as	well	as	the	realisation	of	the	close	relation	between	apoptosis	and	the	immune	system	and	cancer	that	followed	the	molecular	genetic	discoveries	of	the	1980s	and	1990s,	that	gave	it	the	central	prominence	it	deservedly	has	today	as	a	biological	phenomenon.	To	put	the	point	differently,	what	we	think	the	story	of	apoptosis	shows,	is	the	following:	in	the	world	there	are	causal	pathways	for	various	phenomena;	all	causal	pathways	can	be	deemed	mechanisms	in	our	truly	minimal	sense;	but	not	all	those	causal	pathways	are	biologically	interesting	or	signi?icant,	even	if	they	occur	frequently	within	organisms.	Biologically	interesting	or	signi?icant	causal	pathways	are	those	pathways	that	subserve	a	central	function	within	the	organism;	that	is,	whether	a	causal	pathway	is	biologically	interesting	has	to	do	with	features	external	to	the	pathway	itself.		 This	does	not	imply	that	what	is	biologically	interesting	is	something	subjective.	Rather,	it	implies	that	it	is	directly	related	to	biological	practice:	what	the	community	of	biologists	regards	as	the	basic	phenomena	that	must	be	explained	in	order	to	have	both	biological	understanding	and	apply	our	knowledge	clinically.	Thus	we	could	say	that	what	makes	a	causal	pathway	a	speci?ically	biological	mechanism	is	not	something	internal	to	the	pathway	itself;	rather,	it	concerns	the	role	of	that	pathway	within	the	organism.	In	other	words,	whether	a	causal	pathway	is	considered	a	biological	mechanism	by	biologists,	has	to	do	with	a	relational	property	of	the	pathway.	In	the	case	of	apoptosis,	this	relational	property	is	the	homeostatic	function	that	it	subserves.	This	relational	property	is	the	difference	between	a	causal	pathway	like	apoptosis	and	a	causal	pathway	such	as	oncosis.		 However,	suppose	one	were	to	argue	as	follows.	We	should	certainly	let	biological	practice	itself	decide	what	we	should	mean	by	a	‘mechanism’	in	a	biological	context.	If	practice	has	it	that	a	causal	pathway	is	deemed	a	mechanism	by	an	appeal	to	external	features	of	the	pathway,	so	be	it.	TMM	(the	point	would	be)	is	false,	since		
(P-TMM):	mechanism=causal	pathway	+X,	where	X	is	some	biologically	signi?icant	external	feature	of	the	causal	pathway.	
	 Now,	if	one	were	to	argue	like	this,	we	would	not	seriously	object.	We	are	ready	to	accept	that	there	may	well	exist	features	external	to	a	particular	causal	pathway,	and	in	particular	features	that	can	be	established	by	looking	at	biological	practice,	which	
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determine	whether	a	speci?ic	theory-described	causal	pathway	counts	as	a	biological	
mechanism.	But,	in	our	view,	this	attribution	of	‘mechanism’	to	certain	causal	pathways	and	perhaps	not	to	others	would	entail	that	‘mechanism’	is	an	honori?ic	term	attached	to	causal	pathways	that	have	certain	(external)	features.	The	further	scienti?ic	question	then	is	whether	there	is	evidence	that	a	causal	pathway	is	a	‘mechanism’	in	this	sense	or	not.			 In	our	view,	the	choice	between	TMM	and	P-TMM	is	not	particularly	signi?icant:	to	adopt	P-TMM	is	to	claim	that	we	allow	a	distinction	between	a	causal	pathway	for	a	phenomenon	P	and	a	speci?ically	biological	mechanism,	where	the	difference	between	the	two	concerns	an	external	feature	of	the	respective	causal	pathways.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	important	point	is	that	both	views	are	licensed	by	methodological	mechanism:	to	be	committed	to	either	option,	one	need	not	be	committed	to	some	metaphysical	view	about	causation	or	the	ontology	of	mechanisms.	There	is	no	need	to	do	this	in	order	to	understand	scienti?ic	practice.		 Could	someone	insist	that	there	is	some	other	feature	that	differentiates	a	causal	pathway	from	a	mechanism?	A	possibility	here	is	to	adopt	the	requirement	of	causal	modularity	(cf.	Woodward	2002).	Causal	modularity	may	be	seen	as	the	criterion	that	determines	whether	a	process	counts	as	machine-like	or	not;	so,	perhaps	‘mechanism’	should	be	used	only	for	causal	processes	that	exhibit	causal	modularity.	While	modularity	can	be	important	in	many	cases	as	a	requirement	for	a	causal	representation	of	a	system	(this	is	the	robust	form	of	methodological	mechanism	we	mentioned	in	the	beginning),	the	major	disadvantage	of	this	view	is	that	many	instances	of	‘mechanisms’	in	biology	turn	out	not	to	be	such,	since	they	are	not	modular;	apoptosis	is	a	case	in	point	(cf.	Cassini	2016).	So,	adopting	this	view	necessitates	abandoning	taking	scientists’	talk	of	mechanisms	at	face	value.	Lastly,	consider	again	the	worry	mentioned	in	section	3,	according	to	which	not	every	mechanism	is	a	causal	pathway,	since	there	may	exist	‘inactivated’	mechanisms.	Suppose	examples	of	cases	of	‘mechanisms	without	activities’	are	cases	of	‘mechanisms’	that	instead	of	producing	a	change	maintain	stability	(cf.	Illari	&	Williamson	2012).	It	should	then	be	clear	that	homeostatic	mechanisms	within	cells	that	prevent	apoptosis	do	involve	causal	pathways	(e.g.	the	causal	pathway	in	which	anti-apoptotic	proteins	bind	to	pro-apoptotic	ones).	So,	a	causal	pathway	need	not	result	in	a	speci?ic	change;	its	end-result	may	well	be	the	maintaining	of	a	stable	state.	
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7.	Conclusions	Most	philosophical	accounts	of	mechanisms	offer	‘in?lated’	accounts	of	what	mechanisms	are,	raising	questions	about	the	ontology	of	mechanisms	that	seem	not	necessary	in	order	to	understand	scienti?ic	practice.	In	contrast	to	such	accounts,	in	this	paper	we	have	defended	a	de?lationary	account	of	mechanisms:	according	to	what	we	called	Truly	Minimal	Mechanism,	a	mechanism	just	is	a	causal	pathway	that	produces	a	particular	effect.	Moreover,	we	claimed	that	commitment	to	mechanism	in	science	means	adopting	a	certain	methodological	postulate,	i.e.	that	one	should	always	look	for	the	causal	pathways	producing	the	phenomena	of	interest.	As	such,	it	does	not	make	any	general	ontological	assertions	about	the	nature	of	causal	processes.		We	used	the	example	of	apoptosis	to	show	that	several	distinctions	used	by	biologists	in	order	to	differentiate	between	causal	pathways	and	identify	the	genuine	biological	mechanisms	(active	vs.	passive,	programmed	vs.	non-programmed,	physiological	vs.	accidental)	do	not	correspond	to	internal	features	of	causal	pathways,	but	concern	an	external	feature,	i.e.	the	role	those	processes	play	within	the	organism.		What	the	case	of	apoptosis	shows,	then,	is	that	a	truly	minimal	understanding	of	mechanisms	is	all	that	is	needed	in	order	to	understand	biological	practice.	
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	For	a	view	along	similar	lines,	consider	this	quotation	from	Brandon	(1990,	185,	emphasis	added):	“A	1causal/mechanical	explanation	is	one	that	explains	the	phenomenon	of	interest	in	terms	of	the	mechanisms	that	produced	the	phenomenon.	What	is	a	mechanism?	…	[T]his	question	has	no	general	metaphysical	answer,	because	the	business	of	science	is	the	discovery	of	mechanisms;	so	we	cannot	delimit	in	any	a	priori	manner	the	mechanisms	of	nature.	…	The	best	we	can	do	is	to	give	an	open-ended	answer:	a	mechanism	is	any	describable	causal	process”.		Let	us	also	note	here	in	passing	that	in	the	recent	literature	on	mechanisms,	mechanisms	are	very	often	2regarded	as	speci?ic	kinds	of	systems.	We	think	that	this	is	misleading,	since	mechanisms	and	systems	are	different	things:	mechanisms	on	our	view	are	causal	pathways,	and	it	is	strange	to	call	a	causal	pathway	a	‘system’	(see	also	Oulis	2010).
 For	example,	here	is	how	Virchow	in	the	19th	century	describes	necrosis	in	Cellular	Pathology:	“In	3necrosis	we	conceive	the	morti?ied	[gangrenous]	part	to	be	preserved	more	or	less	in	its	external	form”	(quoted	in	Majno	&	Joris	1995,	3-4).	However,	see	Proskuryakov	&	Gabai	(2010)	for	the	argument	that	necrosis	can	in	certain	cases	be	4considered	as	an	active	and	well-regulated	process.
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